

null  
Diana T Fritz 05/24/2007 04:30:13 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results

Cable  
Text:

SECRET

SIPDIS  
TELEGRAM

April 15, 2003

To: No Action Addressee  
Action: Unknown  
From: AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI (ABU DHABI 1828 - UNKNOWN)  
TAGS: PHUM, MARR, MOPS, EAID, PREL, PGOV  
Captions: None  
Subject: TFIZ01: UAE TO DEPLOY LARGE MILITARY FIELD HOSPITAL TO BAGHDAD  
Ref: None

---

S E C R E T ABU DHABI 01828

SIPDIS  
CXABU:  
ACTION: POL  
INFO: RSO AMB ECON DCM P/M

DISSEMINATION: POL  
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: DCM: RAALBRIGHT  
DRAFTED: ECON:TEWILLIAMS  
CLEARED: ECON:CMC, POL:STW, USLO:CAD

VZCZCADI476  
OO RUEHC RUCNRAQ RUEHDE RHEHNSC RUEAIIA RHEFDIA  
RUEKJCS RUEKJCS RUCJACC  
DE RUEHAD #1828/01 1051244  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 151244Z APR 03  
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9448  
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J2/J3/J5/UNMA// IMMEDIATE  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC//OSD/NESA// IMMEDIATE  
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CCJ2/CCJ3/CCJ5// IMMEDIATE  
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 3045  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ABU DHABI 001828

SIPDIS

STATE FOR IRAQ TASK FORCE, NEA/FO, NEA/ARP, NEA/NGA,  
PM FOR A/S BLOOMFIELD, ALSO PMAT

SECDEF FOR USEC FEITH, ALSO PRINCIPAL D/USEC RYAN  
HENRY

KUWAIT FOR HOC AND ORHA

NSC FOR ABRAMS AND P/E KHALILZAD

E.O. 12958: DECL 04/15/13  
TAGS: [PHUM](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [EAID](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [IZ](#) [TC](#)  
SUBJECT: TFIZ01: UAE TO DEPLOY LARGE MILITARY FIELD  
HOSPITAL TO BAGHDAD

¶1. (U) Classified by DCM Richard A. Albright for reasons 1.5 (B) and (D).

¶2. (U) This is an action message -- please see paragraph five.

¶3. (C) UAE Chief of Staff (and de facto Defense Minister) Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayid (MBZ) called the Ambassador 4/14 to relate that the UAEG planned to deploy a large military field hospital to Baghdad and urgently sought consultations with the USG on modalities. Econchief and USLO Deputy Chief met later that evening with UAE Armed Forces Deputy COS MG Hamad Al-Thani Al-Rumaithi and his senior staff to get a briefing on the UAE proposal. Al-Rumaithi said the UAE military would have ready to deploy in about one week a one hundred bed field hospital, 210 military staff (120 medical, 90 support/security), 50 vehicles, associated equipment, and enough supplies for 14-25 days. This same capability had been deployed in Kosovo for 18 months and had a sustained capacity to treat about 250 patients per day. The initial UAE concept is to ship the vehicles and supplies to Umm Qasr, fly the personnel to Kuwait, road march the forces to Umm Qasr and then proceed overland (with appropriate coalition escorts/clearances) to Baghdad for a 90-day plus total deployment.

¶4. (C) Econchief welcomed the proposal and noted that the mission would do everything it could to facilitate. He asked if the UAE would consider deploying to a location other than Baghdad if the need elsewhere in Iraq proved more compelling. Al-Rumaithi demurred, saying the UAEG preferred to be in Baghdad, and hoped to find a suitable building (abandoned or for rent) which it might move into. While the field hospital was capable of operating out of tents, the DCOS said arrangements would be simpler and more comfortable in a more permanent structure. USLO Deputy Chief said he would pass on all the relevant information to the appropriate coalition authorities; would the UAE have any problem being under full coalition operational control? Al-Rumaithi said this would be absolutely no problem. As a first step, USLO Deputy Chief suggested that an Emirati advance team (advon) meet with appropriate coalition officials (once identified) to get a better sense of modalities and timing; he also suggested that UAE LNOs at Centcom Forward be fully briefed on the CONOPS -- the Emiratis said this would be done.

¶5. (S) Comment and action request: Highlighting the domestic and regional political significance of this action, UAE President Zayid has already announced publicly that the military hospital will be deployed to Iraq (see reftel). The Emiratis clearly want to be in Baghdad and, given the UAE leadership investment in this effort, we strongly recommend active support to facilitate this deployment. Welcoming and facilitating this Emirati contribution will send a strong political signal to Arab governments and publics about our willingness to permit them a significant role in Iraq humanitarian relief and reconstruction and will open the door to broader Arab contributions. Furthermore, having 210 uniformed Emirati military personnel on the ground could ease the way for a broader UAE/GCC military role in Iraq stabilization.

¶6. (C) Comment and action request, continued: We need have no concerns with regard to the capabilities or competence of the Emiratis; they have done this all before (the same hospital and staff spent 18 grueling months in Kosovo where they received high marks as part of the UAE's broader military deployments there), are extremely well-equipped and professional and their

support requirements from us will be minimal. The most important step now is to make the deployment happen, and as quickly as possible, by lashing up their ADVON with the appropriate parties. We will continue to coordinate closely with the HOC, ORHA and CENTCOM on this deployment of very real operational and political significance, and request that all involved do all they can to support and expedite.

WAHBA